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Abstract — Although it is widely accepted that the future 
telecommunications access infrastructure relies heavily on Fiber-
to-the-Home (FTTH), its deployment is compromised because it 
requires substantial investment. As such, if the decision to go 
ahead with the investment is made, the partners involved should 
make sure the deployment and operations are performed as 
efficiently and effectively as possible, to ensure both economic 
and social viability. A deployment is efficient if achieved at 
minimum expense and is effective if it reaches the outlined goals. 
This paper analyses the impact of policy decisions affecting the 
efficiency and effectiveness of New Zealand’s public-private 
partnership in charge of building up a nationwide FTTH 
network: the Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB) network.  The paper 
concludes that in the context of such type of partnership a trade-
off exists between efficiency and effectiveness. Although both 
concepts are well suited for assessing the performance of large-
scale projects such as FTTH rollouts, they are not necessarily 
always aligned.  
Keywords —	  Fiber-to-the-Home, broadband policy,  efficiency, 
effectiveness, New Zealand 
I.   INTRODUCTION 
Broadband access encompasses the deployment of a range of 
technologies with Fiber-to-the-Home (FTTH) being favored 
by several worldwide projects; the main goal is to bring higher 
speed and reliability to consumers. Although telecom 
operators in many countries (e.g. Western Europe) were 
privatized 20-30 years ago, the deployment of fiber-based 
access networks has seen a return to government intervention. 
One example is the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) [1]; 
which represents a mixture of public initiative and private 
entrepreneurship, while in other cases private operators 
undertake the construction of fiber networks at their own risk.  
As access to a broadband connection has been deemed 
essential/fundamental to citizens of a country, some 
governments embark on improving and expanding the reach of 
current communications facilities by means of regional or 
nationwide broadband plans. Considering the public nature of 
such a broadband plan, a measurement of achievement is how 
well the deployment serves the households, both in terms of 
deployment time and geographical coverage.  
Broadband upgrades frequently happen via high-speed FTTH 
technology. When the project attempts to cover a whole 
country, cost concerns can lead to a fraction of the connections 
not embodied in fiber but alternative technologies such as 
Very High Bit Rate Digital Subscriber Line (VDSL), Hybrid 
Fiber Coax (HFC), radio access or satellite links. 
When a national or regional authority is – directly or indirectly 
– involved in the deployment of a broadband (FTTH) network, 
this public actor will in most cases not take up the full 
deployment and operations of networks and services. Instead, 
the public involvement will be limited to the infrastructure. In 
order to clarify this, the network responsibilities can be split 
up into three conceptual roles, as visualized in Figure 1 [2]. 
The Physical Infrastructure Provider (PIP) is responsible for 
the passive, dark fiber infrastructure (rights-of-way, trenches, 
ducts and fibers). The Network Provider (NP) lights up the 
passive network by installing active equipment at both the 
network side (central office) and the end user’s side (Customer 
Premises Equipment – CPE). The Service Provider (SP), 
finally, uses the end-to-end connectivity offered by the NP to 
offer content and applications in dedicated services to the end 
user. Multiple NPs can share the PIP’s infrastructure if the 
network is opened on fiber or wavelength layer, while 
multiple SPs can compete using the connectivity offered by 
one NP when opening on bitstream layer. 
 
Figure	  1:	  Overview	  of	  conceptual	  layers	  and	  access	  options	  
Public involvement in broadband deployment of course 
envisions the best use of taxpayers’ money, and aims at 
reaching as many households as possible without giving in on 
the quality of the service. A deployment is efficient if 
achieved at minimum expense and is effective if it reaches the 
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outlined goals. In essence, the goals are thus set as to 
maximize effectiveness (i.e. the goals) and efficiency (i.e. the 
way the goals are reached). Section II provides more details 
about how both concepts can be defined and indicates how 
both can be used for assessing a PPP broadband project. 
In 2009, the New Zealand government created Crown Fibre 
Holdings (CFH), a company charged with managing a PPP 
with four Local Fibre Companies (LFCs) for the deployment 
of a FTTH network to 75% of the households in the country. 
This project, known as Ultra-Fast Broadband (UFB), is 
complemented by the Rural Broadband Initiative (RBI). This 
second infrastructure project covers a further 22.8% of 
households with alternative technologies (VDSL, fixed-
wireless, satellite).  
For the UFB, the contracts between CFH and the LFCs are 
quite detailed in terms of both economic and technological 
requirements. The contract terms can be summarized as 
follows [3]: 
• LFCs are obliged to deploy a Gigabit Passive Optical 
Network (GPON) and offer bitstream access to all SPs on 
equal terms. LFCs thus act as a combined PIP-NP. 
• The network should also be capable to offer Point-to-Point 
(P2P) access on request (albeit for a relatively high price). 
• Unbundling on the fiber layer (on top of PIP) should be 
possible from 2020 onwards.  
• Wholesale offers are fixed in terms of download and 
upload speed (30/10 and 100/50 Mbps), and price. 
• The deployment should focus on priority users first (e.g. 
schools, hospitals, large businesses); residential homes are 
targeted in a second stage. 
The RBI on the other hand aims to cover the less densely 
populated areas, where the cost for deploying FTTH would be 
too high. The main aspects of the deployment are [4]: 
• Connecting 252,000 rural households by 2016 (about 90% 
of homes and businesses outside UFB areas), 
• with speeds of at least 5Mbps through a mix of VDSL and 
fixed-wireless services, 
• by two operators selected as RBI partners:  
o a fixed-line operator deploying fiber to cabinets and 
improved copper-based broadband (VDSL and ADSL), 
o and a wireless operator charged with the provision of 
fixed-wireless.  
In early 2015 the UFB and RBI initiatives described above 
were renamed as Phase 1 to distinguish them from plans to 
extend their scope. Now, plans aim at increasing the FTTH 
coverage from 75% to least 80% of households, for which 
additional funding of up to $210 million (UFB extension) and 
$100 million (RBI) has been announced.    
The contract terms and related obligations set by the New 
Zealand government, such as the open access obligation and 
the “priority users first” deployment sequence, of course 
impact the technological evolution of the network. Therefore, 
after a few years of continuous progress in UFB and RBI 
deployments, as well as following the recent announcement 
for extension, assessing the impact of the policy decisions on 
the PPP project, in terms of efficiency and effectiveness, can 
lead to useful insights.  
The rest of this paper unfolds as follows: section II gives an 
overview of common definitions of both efficiency and 
effectiveness, and identifying suitable indicators for 
measurement. Section III gives an overview of the current 
status of the UFB deployment and progress. The combination 
of the analytical framework and the UFB data serve as input 
for section IV, in which policy decisions made in the New 
Zealand case are assessed. Finally, section V provides 
conclusions for this paper and gives directions for future work. 
II. EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS 
As the goal of this paper is to draw conclusions about the 
efficiency and effectiveness of broadband deployments, a first 
step requires clearly defining both. This section will therefore 
introduce the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness and 
draw from that knowledge to identify characteristics to 
measure them. In short, effectiveness indicates to what extent 
the set goals are reached, while efficiency means the extent to 
which the minimum effort is incurred in reaching those goals. 
Typically, being efficient is adamant to minimizing the cost of 
reaching the goal. As such, effectiveness means doing the 
right thing, while efficiency is about doing the things right [5].  
A. Efficiency 
An accepted definition of efficiency implies “being productive 
without waste” [6]. Lemstra and Groenewegen describe five 
interpretations of the term efficiency [7] as follows: 
-­‐ Technical efficiency refers to a firm using the minimum 
quantity of inputs required to produce a desired output.  
-­‐ Productive efficiency denotes the firm’s efforts to incur 
minimum long-run average costs in its production 
process. It translates into finding the right balance 
between capital, upfront investment and recurring, 
operational expenditures.  
-­‐ Allocative efficiency, also referred to as Pareto 
efficiency, deals with the allocation of resources in a way 
that the production is done at a level at which the 
marginal (last) unit cost equals the marginal benefit to 
consumers; it can also be stated as “not being able to 
make one consumer better off without disadvantaging 
another one”.   
-­‐ Adaptive efficiency measures the flexibility and 
responsiveness of the firm to adapt to market changes 
both in consumer demand and technological capabilities.  
-­‐ Finally, dynamic efficiency indicates the adaptation to 
long-term changes, i.e. to what extent the firm innovates 
with the goal of increasing its return on investment.  
Fourie and Burger [8] furthermore argue that, in a properly 
functioning market, efficiency is driven by competition, risk 
and incentives for profit maximization. Private parties use the 
promise of personal financial gain to find a motive for 
producing at lowest cost, while the threat of a competitive 
offer stimulates efficiency to survive. Their research indicates 
that, in order to maximize efficiency, competition and private 
operator’s equity should be maximized, while uncertainties 
about demand estimation and the social importance of the 
product should be minimized. 
There are incentives to being technically efficient; using the 
least amount of inputs to deliver on a goal translates also into 
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reducing costs. Therefore technical efficiency can be also 
understood as a prerequisite to productive efficiency. In a 
high-speed broadband network deployment process a trade-off 
frequently is involved: a more reliable, but more expensive, 
network management system can reduce later operational and 
maintenance costs significantly, resulting in overall savings 
and hence desirable gains in productive efficiency.  
Broadband deployments display some of the economic aspects 
that get in the way of allocative efficiency; for instance, when 
the network turn out to be a monopoly and its operation is 
riddled with externalities. When the deployment is a result of 
developing public policy, questions can be raised about the 
allocation of (public) resources to the construction of fiber 
connections. Allocative efficiency is considered an 
indispensable tool to measure how much markets and public 
policy improve or harm groups in a society. Its utilization may 
shed light on the kind of efficiency a broadband deployment 
generates [9].	  
Within the case of a FTTH deployment, the uptake is always 
uncertain and can only be estimated. The latter compromises 
the ability of the firm to be adaptively efficient. The capital 
investment should be such that the right balance between 
technical/productive efficiency and guaranteed return on 
investment must be found. On the other hand the deployment 
itself calls for a commitment to a given network technology 
and network architecture which, hopefully, should be chosen 
with the most flexible, state-of-the-art technology in mind. 
Once the decision is made and the network investment is sunk, 
adaptation to long-term evolution would need to happen in 
upper layers of the network hierarchy. 
B. Effectiveness 
Effectiveness, on the other hand, measures the extent to which 
both private and public goals are achieved [8]. It basically 
indicates the ratio of actual output to planned or expected 
output [5]. As for efficiency, different types of effectiveness 
can be identified but there should always be a clear indication 
of the goal. Cost-effectiveness for instance measures whether 
the product is produced under a certain cost threshold (and is 
as such different from efficiency, which is about minimizing 
the production cost).  
OECD’s approach to PPPs asserts that “faced with deciding 
between traditional procurement and PPP a government will 
then choose the most affordable option with the potential to 
deliver the highest value for money (VFM)” [1]. Building 
upon the OECD approach, [10] relates effectiveness to the 
concept of VFM, a criterion that involves risk transfer, 
performance measurements, incentives, and generation of 
additional revenue, arguing that a more effective project will 
lead to a higher VFM. Inquiring about effectiveness helps 
clear the way to determining the VFM a PPP or a procurement 
project is expected to deliver.  
Linking the concept of effectiveness to FTTH deployments 
under a PPP approach demands for evaluation of both public 
and private goals, the public goal being the maximization of 
welfare (by efforts to maximize employment or GDP), while 
the private goal is the maximization of profit. 
C. Efficient and effective FTTH deployments 
In the context of an infrastructure project that aims at 
achieving social goals, effectiveness implies that these goals 
are maximally served, whereas efficiency measures whether 
consumer preferences are optimally served [8]. Although in an 
ideal world, project managers would like to reach high levels 
of both efficiency and effectiveness, reality seems to dictate 
they are frequently confronted in a way that suggests a trade-
off between them. For example, in the case of broadband 
deployment, deploying FTTH to 100% of population 
(consequently meeting public goals and effectiveness) requires 
high investments in hard-to-reach rural areas and fails meeting 
deployment at lowest possible cost, and efficiency. 
Compromises involving fixed-wireless or satellite 
deployments to these rural areas try to meet both concepts as 
much as possible. As such, the decision of serving broadband 
by using both the UFB (full-FTTH deployment) and the RBI 
(DSL and fixed/wireless) can be seen as a first efficiency-
effectiveness trade-off in New Zealand’s public decisions. 
This seeming trade-off is best addressed when ways of 
measuring both parameters can be identified. Table 1 displays 
a list of proposed indicators that qualitatively and 
quantitatively measure aspects of the two concepts and can 
serve to draw conclusions on the impact of policy decisions on 
broadband deployments. 
A distinction is made between operator indicators and market 
indicators. Operator indicators measure efficiency and 
effectiveness by factors that an operator itself can control or, 
to a large extent, can influence. They include speed of 
deployment, availability and cost of deployment. Speed of 
deployment indicates how fast the network is being rolled out 
and can be taken as an indicator of reaching the set goals on 
time. Availability indicates the extent to which users can 
actually get connected to the network at a desired speed. It is 
related to coverage but unlike being concerned only with 
whether the network has already been passed by, it refers to 
available offers in terms of bandwidth, thus an effectiveness 
measure (mainly from a public point of view). Finally, cost of 
deployment denotes the money spent on building a broadband 
connection and bringing it up for offer, thus serves as an 
indicator for technical efficiency.  
Table	  1:	  Indicators	  for	  measuring	  efficiency	  and	  effectiveness	  
 Efficiency Effectiveness 
Operator indicators 
Speed of deployment x  
Availability  x 
Cost of deployment x  
Market indicators 
Competition  x 
Uptake  x 
Uptake-coverage ratio x  
 
The second part of the table identifies market indicators, 
which cannot be influenced by one party solely (either the 
government, the regulator or an operator), but depends on the 
structure and characteristics of the market, customer demand 
and service competition. Competition relates to both the 
number of providers on the market as well as the price setting. 
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It is an effectiveness indicator for the public partner, as it 
represents the dynamicity of the market. Uptake is a measure 
of how many customers have indeed decided to purchase a 
broadband connection and can thus be categorized as an 
effectiveness measure because maximizing the number of 
subscribers is both a public and a private target. The ratio of 
uptake to coverage, on the other hand, links to the business 
case efficiency of the deploying operator; i.e. does the 
operator obtain sufficient return for its sunk investment?  
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE UFB DEPLOYMENT 
The goal of this paper is to assess the efficiency and 
effectiveness of New Zealand’s UFB project at this stage of 
deployment (five years into the project, but still almost four 
years to completion of stage 1). The authors collected data 
from a number of sources, from both the involved LFCs ([11]-
[14]), the public partner company CFH ([3]), and 
commercially available data on SPs’ websites (e.g. [15]-[19]).  
The coverage details the percentage of homes passed per area 
until June 2015 [20]. The daily deployment rates (DDR) 
indicate the number of households passed per day, per area. 
Past DDR were calculated over the first 1431 days (from the 
project start through June 30 2015) whereas the remaining 
DDR were calculated over 1645 remaining days (from June 30 
2015 through Dec 31 2019). The target rates indicate the 
number of homes that should be passed to reach to overall 
coverage goal by the end of 2019, reflecting the average DDR 
that is needed to reach the coverage targets set out by the 
government. The uptake indicates the number of households 
subscribed to the UFB, and is represented relatively to the 
total number of homes (uptake) and relatively to the number 
of homes that can subscribe (uptake to coverage ratio) [20]. 
The next column indicates the number of active residential 
SPs, while the final column shows the number of households 
per coverage area (i.e. the total potential market). The 
availability indicator can be assessed by taking the input from 
both columns on coverage and number of SPs.  
The cost of a premise passed has been decreasing over time. 
Estimates for Chorus deployment of the UFB indicate that 
when the rollout started in 2012, the cost per premises passed 
was about NZD 3,500 (USD 2,760) compared to NZD 2,134 
(USD 1,810) in 2014 [21].  Furthermore, the cost per premise 
connected, which amounts to the expense incurred in when 
connecting premises to the fiber passing the premises, was 
about NZD 1,233 (USD 1,050) in 2014 falling steadily since 
2012 [21].   
 
	  
Table	  2:	  Overview	  of	  deployment	  parameters	  per	  area	  (June	  2015)	  Area% Coverage% Past%DDR%(#households)% Target%DDR%(#households)% Remaining%DDR%(#households)% UFB%uptake% UFB%uptake%to%coverage%ratio% Number%of%residential%SPs%% Number%of%households%Northpower% 100%% 13.3% 6.2% 0.0% 20.1%% 20.1%% 10% 19,100%
!! Whangarei% 100%% 13.3% 6.2% 0.0% 20.1%% 20.1%% 10% 19,100%UltraFast%Fibre% 89%% 105.8% 55.4% 11.5% 11.7%% 13.2%% 14% 170,300%
!! Hamilton% 83%% 38.7% 21.7% 6.9% 11.3%% 13.6%% 20% 66,800%
!! Tauranga% 90%% 28.4% 14.7% 2.7% 15.5%% 17.2%% 16% 45,200%
!! Tokoroa% 100%% 3.4% 1.6% 0.0% 9.2%% 9.2%% 19% 4,900%
!! New%Plymouth% 85%% 12.2% 6.7% 1.9% 9.4%% 11.0%% 11% 20,600%
!! Hawera% 100%% 11.5% 5.3% 0.0% 8.1%% 8.1%% 8% 16,400%
!! Wanganui% 100%% 11.5% 5.3% 0.0% 9.1%% 9.1%% 8% 16,400%Enable% 47%% 47.3% 46.8% 46.4% 7.5%% 16.0%% 10% 144,100%
!! Christchurch&%Rangiora% 47%% 47.3% 46.8% 46.4% 7.5%% 16.0%% 10% 144,100%Chorus% 47%% 259.5% 255.9% 252.7% 7.0%% 14.9%% 9% 787,100%
!! Auckland% 39%% 101.4% 120.9% 137.9% 6.6%% 16.9%% 18% 372,000%
!! Rotorua% 90%% 13.1% 6.8% 1.3% 12.7%% 14.1%% 11% 20,900%
!! Taupo% 100%% 6.9% 3.2% 0.0% 6.1%% 6.1%% 6% 9,900%
!! Whakatane% 61%% 2.3% 1.8% 1.3% 4.6%% 7.5%% 7% 5,500%
!! Gisborne% 36%% 3.1% 4.0% 4.8% 2.2%% 6.0%% 5% 12,300%
!! Napier/Hastings% 45%% 12.9% 13.3% 13.7% 6.6%% 14.6%% 11% 40,900%
!! Palmerston%North% 62%% 12.1% 9.1% 6.4% 10.4%% 16.8%% 11% 27,900%
!! Feilding% 32%% 1.3% 1.8% 2.3% 1.9%% 5.9%% 11% 5,600%
!! Masterton% 89%% 5.3% 2.8% 0.6% 9.7%% 10.9%% 6% 8,500%
!! Kapiti% 30%% 3.4% 5.3% 7.0% 0.8%% 2.8%% 4% 16,400%
!! Wellington% 35%% 30.9% 41.0% 49.9% 5.0%% 14.4%% 17% 126,200%
!! Levin% 33%% 1.6% 2.3% 2.9% 1.6%% 4.9%% 6% 7,100%
!! Nelson% 56%% 9.2% 7.6% 6.3% 6.4%% 11.4%% 9% 23,500%
!! Blenheim% 100%% 7.8% 3.6% 0.0% 18.9%% 18.9%% 8% 11,100%
!! Greymouth% 83%% 2.0% 1.1% 0.4% 4.0%% 4.8%% 2% 3,500%
!! Ashburton% 100%% 5.7% 2.6% 0.0% 14.2%% 14.2%% 6% 8,100%
!! Timaru% 100%% 8.9% 4.2% 0.0% 16.3%% 16.3%% 8% 12,800%
!! Oamaru% 100%% 4.1% 1.9% 0.0% 11.4%% 11.4%% 6% 5,800%
!! Queenstown% 82%% 2.8% 1.6% 0.5% 7.7%% 9.4%% 8% 4,900%
!! Dunedin% 53%% 16.5% 14.5% 12.7% 8.4%% 15.8%% 15% 44,500%
!! Invercargill% 60%% 8.3% 6.4% 4.8% 7.2%% 12.0%% 9% 19,700%
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IV. THE  IMPACT OF POLICY DECISIONS 
As mentioned above, the technological partner does not solely 
take the decisions to deploy high-speed broadband networks in 
an efficient and effective manner. When public funds or 
another type of government support is involved, all funding 
parties want to reach their own goals and as such impose 
certain obligations onto the network, which directly affect its 
technical specifications and may later have a sizable impact on 
key market determinants as the network becomes operational. 
As this paper focuses solely on the UFB deployment in New 
Zealand, assessing the relative efficiency and effectiveness of 
the entire project is not possible, as no comparisons are made 
to other deployments (this is beyond the scope of this paper, 
but interested readers can be referred to [22]-[24]). An 
absolute assessment of efficiency and effectiveness is the aim 
of this paper, and more precisely evaluating the impact of 
certain specific policy decisions on both performance 
parameters. 
A. Bitstream open access to everyone 
In New Zealand, the government decided that the UFB 
network should be a GPON (Point-to-Multipoint, P2MP), on 
which any LFC would offer connectivity to any interested 
service provider on non-discriminatory conditions (the LFC 
thus assuming the role of PIP and NP, see Figure 1). This 
connectivity is offered through setting up a virtual tunnel 
(bitstream), and should be done in an open access way, 
implying that the LFCs cannot act as SPs themselves, as they 
are only allowed to provide wholesale services.  
The bitstream open access obligation has multiple 
consequences. On the one hand, bitstream access allows for 
multiple service providers to use one underlying network, 
hence promoting competition between service providers 
without needing to duplicate the infrastructure. As of Q1 2015, 
87 service providers (both residential and business) were 
offering services on the UFB network countrywide. As seen in 
Table 2, some areas are served by up to 20 residential SPs. 
Such a number is a significant increase in comparison to the 
copper-based market where Spark (formerly Telecom) is the 
dominant player (50%), leading Vodafone (32%) and a fringe 
of smaller providers [25]. It enhances the ability of a customer 
to get the best match between her expectations and what the 
market offers, so making a positive contribution to improve 
competition, one indicator of effectiveness. Furthermore, 
although absolute prices for broadband access have remained 
stable, customers now receive faster connections (both in 
download and upload speed) with higher or unlimited data 
caps for the same price (e.g. [15]-[19]). 
On the other hand, the open access part of the obligation has 
both positive and negative effects. Non-discriminatory open 
access stimulates competition, which increases customer 
choice, but also has the downside of lacking a direct link 
between the LFC and the end customers. This therefore raises 
an interesting issue: if the LFCs are not allowed to interact 
directly with customers, how can they stimulate customers’ 
subscriptions and hence reach higher uptake? This issue is 
reflected in the relatively low uptake to coverage ratios 
(absolute uptake hence being even lower) as shown in Table 2. 
Recent data for selected areas [20] however show a significant 
increase in uptake (a number of areas reaching 15-20%), but 
this uptake might have been higher had the LFCs themselves 
been allowed to subscribe end customers.  
B. Fiber unbundling on request  
Apart from bitstream access, the LFCs are also obliged to 
offer Point-to-Point (P2P) dark fiber on request. Dark fiber 
unbundling translates into allowing other providers to use the 
passive infrastructure – leasing out access to PIP level (see 
Figure 1) – in order to operate services that will then compete 
with those of the LFCs; in doing so, such providers will turn 
themselves into wholesalers, thus becoming competitors of the 
LFCs at the NP level with the LFCs continue to hold a 
monopoly at the PIP level. 
These requests for P2P and dark fiber access of course have a 
significant impact on the network (Figure 2), as they require 
physical fiber to be leased instead of virtual tunnels. In order 
to cope with the expected variety of (future) requests, the 
LFCs decided to over-dimension their FTTH networks. The 
main features of such decisions are: 
• Multiple feeder fibers drawn in between the central office 
and the street cabinet (in this part of the network multiple 
end users share fibers), or extra empty ducts deployed in the 
existing feeder trenches, which can be filled with air-blown 
fiber as soon as needed for new users that join the network.  
• Reserved space needed in the street cabinets for installation 
of extra splitters in order to allow for a multi-NP scenario.  
• Every household connected to the street cabinet using two 
fibers in the distribution section (from street cabinet to 
customer’s house), which means that a customer can, in the 
future, be connected to at most two NPs at the same time. 
 
Figure	   2:	   Overview	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   fibre	   unbundling	   on	   the	  
network	  deployment	  cost	  
Though over-dimensioning of the network makes it future-
proof, the extra investment is not directly countered by extra 
revenues, as fiber unbundling is not included in the standard 
wholesale offer. We can thus conclude that, although this 
over-dimensioning entails a decrease in efficiency (in terms of 
cost of deployment), it might lead to higher - public - 
effectiveness (more competition) and possibly lower prices (as 
wholesale competition might push the price towards marginal 
cost). This statement can unfortunately not be backed up by 
quantitative data, as there is no area-specific cost data 
available and the demand for dark fiber unbundling remains 
uncertain. 
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C. The tender process and the funding scheme 
The selection of the LFCs was based on a number of tender 
processes, one for each reference area (Figure 3, for an 
overview of the areas see Table 2). Three new companies 
(Northpower, Ultra-Fast Fibre and Enable) were chosen for 9 
areas, while Chorus, a company divested from the former 
incumbent Telecom, serves the remaining areas [27].  
 
Figure	  3:	  Geographical	  allocation	  of	   the	  reference	  areas	   following	  
the	  tender	  process	  [10].	  
The new partner companies follow a so-called “funds-
recycling” mode, a funding scheme in which the government 
funds the fiber passing (the fiber in the streets, the public 
domain), while the partner funds the drop section (from the 
street to the customer’s premises), as seen in Figure 4. When a 
customer subscribes, the LFC pays back a representative part 
of the network investment to CFH and connects the customer 
by deploying the drop. As this drop section is only installed at 
the moment a customer decides to subscribe to the UFB, the 
LFC is ensured of revenues at the moment it has to invest its 
own funds [27].  
 
Figure	  4:	  Graphical	  representation	  of	  funds-­‐recycling	  scheme	  
Chorus, on the other hand, uses the “investment model”, 
according to which the government injects funds directly into 
the company. Chorus autonomously decides how to use them 
while having to comply with agreed coverage and uptake 
targets. Chorus is also responsible for the operations and 
maintenance of the copper-based DSL network, which runs in 
parallel to the UFB network. 
With 724,000 homes passed as of June 30 2015, completion 
rates in the UFB areas range from 30% to 100%, with an 
overall average achieved coverage of 72% (an increase of 20% 
when compared to June 2014). The daily deployment rate is 
425 homes passed per day, which is higher than the target rate 
of around 365 households per day. Table 2 displays both rates 
for each LFC. These figures help providing a quantitative 
support to analyze the efficiency and effectiveness of the UFB 
deployment from an operator’s perspective by using the speed 
of deployment and the availability indicators. 
The LFCs that signed the funds-recycling scheme, have 
achieved completion rates of 100% (Northpower), 89% 
(UltraFast Fibre) and 47% (Enable). Apart from Enable, 
whose lower DDR can be explained by the delays caused by 
the earthquake of February 2011 [28], the local LFCs prove to 
be more efficient in delivering on their targets than their larger 
counterpart. Their targets have been either met or are on the 
right pathway towards completion on time. The completion 
rate of Chorus stands at 47%, with the additional complication 
that among its least developed areas are the two main urban 
areas of the country. The two cities (Auckland and 
Wellington) comprise 40% of the country’s population but up 
until June 2015, only 30-40% of their households have a fiber 
connection available. The latter seems to suggest that the 
funds-recycling scheme is providing a higher incentive for fast 
deployment than the combination of the investment model 
with the foreseen technology replacement of Chorus’ own 
DSL services. As customers are not likely to be subscribed to 
both FTTH and DSL, the FTTH uptake will bring down DSL 
consumption, hence leading to a cannibalization of Chorus’ 
DSL offer. In favor of the funds recycling scheme, one could 
argue that the option of reclaiming ownership of the network 
by purchasing parts of the network when assured of revenues 
provides a clear incentive to complete the deployment faster 
than in case of the investment model, which leads to a (at least 
partially) third party ownership. 
Apart from speed of deployment and coverage, one could also 
investigate if there is a link between the LFC (smaller local 
company or large former incumbent) and consumer uptake, as 
there seems to be no direct incentive for the LFCs under the 
funding recycling scheme to attract new customers. A new 
subscriber causes the LFC to incur a double expense: the 
investment in the connection (drop section and connection in 
the central office, see Figure 4) as well as a reimbursement to 
CFH, while only getting a limited security on the revenue side, 
usually a contract for a maximum of 24 months. Most recent 
data at the area level (see Table 2) indicates that as of Q2 2015 
the highest uptake figures were split among areas covered by 
three new LFCs with the largest two cities – Auckland and 
Wellington, both served by Chorus - hovering around the 15% 
mark. Rather than a clear effect of the funding model on 
uptake the figures seem to suggest the usual decisions by 
service providers to focus on the more densely populated 
areas.  
D. Pricing and competition on different networks 
A deal between CFH and the LFCs fixed the prices for the 
wholesale offers, 30/10 and 100/50 (Mbps down/up), at NZD 
37.50 and NZD 55.00, respectively. LFCs can bring other 
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offers to the market but the two offers mentioned above must 
be made available at least until 2020. These prices are 
comparable to the current wholesale charges on the legacy 
DSL network (current proposal stands at NZD 38.39 [29]), 
while the lowest bandwidth offer (30/10) is not significantly 
faster than speeds already offered in certain parts of the 
country on Chorus’ DSL network. The current debate on the 
price of copper is being fuelled by recent challenges to the 
Commerce Commission’s decision to reduce the rental price 
of copper lines, a decision aimed to benefit users of DSL 
connections; however reducing the price of copper may not be 
in the best interest of the needed growth in UFB uptake as 
users may not see the benefits of subscribing to a more 
expensive service. When the new product does not exhibit an 
obvious, superior characteristic than the old one it becomes 
hard for service providers to convince customers to switch to 
the UFB network, hence impacting the uptake-to-coverage 
ratio as well as the business case for the operators. 
Incentives to reach allocative efficiency in the deployment of 
this PPP-based FTTH broadband network tend to be obscured 
by the way the contractual terms are set up; the future network 
should be operated as a monopoly with open access 
obligations while construction must proceed under, usually, 
tight budget. With wholesale prices negotiations happening 
way before the first connection is lit, it is hard to know or even 
estimate the price mark up over marginal cost.  
On the other hand, as already shown in section IV.A, this 
geographical infrastructure monopoly has led to a significant 
increase in competition on the higher network layers. When 
comparing the achieved uptake with the number of active 
residential SPs in the area, Table 2 shows a clear positive link 
with both uptake and uptake-to-coverage ratio: areas with an 
uptake of over 13% have a choice of at least 10 providers 
(with two exceptions: Tokoroa and Feilding, reaching only 
9.2% and 5.9%, respectively). Furthermore, the network now 
allows for start-ups to arise and gain market on a local scale, 
taking the examples of local service providers such as 
Gisborne.net (Gisborne area), Earthlight (Dunedin) and the 
Uber group (Whangarei).  
E. Priority users 
A group of designated “priority users” occupy a special place 
in the broadband expansion project. The contracts the LFCs 
signed with the government request that these priority users, 
such as schools and rural hospitals, be connected first. To date 
the numbers of schools connected to fiber service of 100 Mbps 
are 1,403 and 1,020 by UFB and RBI, respectively (as of June 
2015 [30]). The RBI further serves 52 more schools, which are 
located in remote areas are receiving point-to-point wireless 
connections with peak speeds of at least 10 Mbps.  
Non-surprisingly the contract conditions reveal a tension 
between an understandable government’s policy goal and the 
LFC’s commercial goals. One could argue that while such 
obligations, when met, constitute a certain contribution to the 
effectiveness of the deployment of broadband services, such a 
“priority-users first” deployment is unable to follow the most 
economic route, thereby affecting the speed and cost of 
deployment [31]. While this latter conclusion may well fit 
reality, quantitative underpinning is not possible because no 
data on the actual deployment routes and area-specific costs is 
available. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
The Ultra-Fast Broadband deployment in New Zealand was 
conceived as a Public-Private partnership which, halfway 
through its expected duration, is already delivering important 
benefits to those who have opted for connecting. The short-
term objective of the government was to put the country back 
on the higher notches of the OECD’s digital ranking by 
providing a renewed, more powerful communication 
infrastructure to businesses and households.  
As a way to provide an assessment framework to an 
unfinished project such as the UFB network, this paper 
proposed a set of indicators that capture different expressions 
of efficiency and effectiveness; the indicators pertain aspects 
of a deployment that stakeholders may be most interested in or 
more acquainted with. Six indicators were defined in two 
categories: operator indicators and market indicators. Operator 
indicators, which can be influenced by one single partner, are 
availability and speed and cost of deployment. Market 
indicators on the other hand depend on the adoption, market 
structure and evolution: competition, uptake and uptake-to-
coverage ratio. Using publicly available data the paper aimed 
to quantify the assessment by using the indicators to analyze 
the efficiency and effectiveness of the deployment. 
The evaluation revolved around assessing the impact of five 
distinct policy decisions: the open access requirement, the 
fiber unbundling obligation, the tender process and financial 
funding scheme, pricing and competition, and special dispense 
given to priority users.  
The first policy decision, the open access requirement on 
bitstream level, opens up the network for increased 
competition and customer fiber uptake - hence improving 
public effectiveness. However, it prohibits the LFCs, which 
can only provide wholesale services, to directly influence the 
uptake on their networks, thus impacting the efficiency of 
their business case. The network flexibility introduced by the 
fiber unbundling obligation increases the opportunities for 
competition, but on the other hand negatively impacts the 
operators’ efficiency in terms of cost of deployment.  
The dual funding structure represented by the funds-recycling 
and the investment models does not seem to have a significant 
impact on the uptake, especially when taking into account the 
potential effect of cannibalization of the DSL network for 
Chorus.  
Wholesale price levels for DSL services impact the uptake as 
users, frequently not fully aware of fiber benefits, may prefer 
cheaper services. Finally, the “priority users”- first decision 
shows (at least qualitatively) a clear trade-off between public 
and private goals. 
The previous observations point at one revealing aspect of the 
relationship between efficiency and effectiveness in the 
context of a PPP. While both concepts help partners evaluate 
the success of the project, the two are not necessarily aligned. 
Such ‘misalignment’ suggests a trade-off may exist between 
efficiency and effectiveness by which trying to increase one 
may come at the expense of the other.  
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Future work of course includes updating the results as 
deployment progress continues and uptake increases. 
Secondly, the analysis could be enhanced if more detailed data 
were available. Uptake should be more explicitly measured, 
both in terms of FTTH specifically and broadband (FTTH, 
DSL, DOCSIS, fixed-wireless) in general, as well as in terms 
of service offerings (download speed, upload speed, data cap). 
Furthermore, although sufficient data for reliable statistical 
analysis (e.g. regression methods) might not be available yet, 
future studies should also evaluate the effects of the UFB 
project on the welfare and economic prosperity of the country 
(measured e.g. in terms of employment rates or GDP), as the 
latter might better reflect the actual goals of the public partner 
in such a large infrastructure project.  
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